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Competition and Coexistence
The variety of channels through which China"s growing economic and political weight has begun impinging upon other countries has aroused intense interest and not a little concern.
Nowhere is this interest -and concern -stronger than in China"s Southeast Asian neighborhood. 5 The economies in this region are feeling the sharp edge of competition from
Chinese products in their shared export markets. They also are benefiting from China"s swelling appetite for imports fuelled by growth of GDP averaging close to 10 percent per annum between 2001 and 2007. Southeast Asian countries can see the positive and negative sides of the trade ledger and, they are reassured that in the medium term, China"s rapid development is likely to be a plus. It has provided new and fast growing markets for their exports and opportunities for investment by companies in S.E. Asia. Although, a substantial volume of foreign capital is now heading towards China, enough is still flowing into SE Asia, which soothes nerves. Moreover, governments in S.E. Asian countries believe that their business environment, manufacturing capabilities and the skills of their workforce provide them with a competitive edge. They also derive some comfort from the rising wages in China"s coastal cities that they hope will prevent any widening of the cost advantage in China"s favor. 6 Even if China squeezes Southeast Asian producers out of the markets for low tech, labor intensive, "commodified" manufactures, countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore see opportunities in moving up the value chain and of diversifying into profitable niches via technological upgrading and innovation.
Policymakers throughout the region and around the Pacific Rim, console themselves that the laws of trade theory are firmly on their side. In a globalizing and growing world economy, a 5 China"s interaction with the ASEAN region via trade, cultural exchange, a tribute system and military incursions (into Vietnam), is of long standing. The links were tightened by migration from primarily Guangdong and Fujian provinces starting in the eighteenth century. Ethnic Chinese comprise 10 percent of the Thai population and 28 percent of the population of Malaysia. However, the degree of assimilation of the ethnic Chinese population in Thailand, a predominantly Buddhist country, is far higher. In all, up to 40 million Chinese live in S.E. Asia and their presence is a factor in China"s economic and cultural engagement with the region. Strategic and military concerns have also surfaced in recent years, which are stoked by rivalry with the U.S. Some countries in the region have used this rivalry to move closer to China and their pull reinforces China"s efforts to increase its influence (Vaughn and Morrison 2006 , Lijun 2007 , Hughes 2005 . 6 See Banister (2005) on wage trends in the 1990s and into the early 2000s and Inagaki (2006) on labor shortages in the coastal areas starting around 2002. Also see "How rising wages are changing" 2006. Alongside wages, productivity is also increasing which contains unit costs and China"s overall employment in manufacturing is not on the rise.
4 country, even a very large one, cannot have a comparative advantage in all products and services (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2007) . This is where matters rest. Across S.E. Asia there is wariness over China"s economic muscle and export competitiveness but no sense of panic. However, there is also a realization that market conditions have changed irrevocably; competition is much fiercer and survival will depend on more determined efforts to increase efficiency, to move up the technology ladder, to innovate and to diversify into products and services that promise to generate higher profits. The current thinking in S.E. Asia raises three main questions: Do recent trends in trade and FDI point to the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between China and the economies of S.E. Asia, with a mutually advantageous division of labor whereby China assembles and exports mainly final products and buys many of the components and other imports from its Asian neighbors? If in fact, there is the likelihood of much greater competition in existing product categories, what are the options for S.E. Asia? Are economies such as Malaysia and Thailand evolving the capabilities which will enable them to thrive and grow in an international market environment within which China and later India, are two of the most dynamic players?
The balance of this paper will examine the interplay between China on the one hand and
Malaysia and Thailand on the other, two countries which are representative of S.E. Asia. The challenges posed by China for S.E. Asia are described and assessed in section 2. Sections 3 through 7 discuss how Malaysia and Thailand are affected by the "China factor". Section 8 sums up the findings and presents two scenarios on future outcomes and examines their implications.
How China's Development Affects South-East Asia
Prior to 1979, China was Asia"s most populous country but its economic presence in the region was relatively insignificant. In 1979, China accounted for just 1.8 percent of global GDP and its total trade amounted to only $0.18 billion. By comparison (in 1979) , the value of Korea"s trade was $39.5 billion and that of Taiwan (China) was $ 35.1 billion. However, following the decision by China"s leadership to "open" the economy, to adopt the export oriented approach to industrialization tested by other East Asian countries and to move from a command to a market driven economy, institutional change was quickened by daring reforms. This led to a phenomenal acceleration in the growth of both GDP and trade (Table 1 and for a discussion of   5 China"s reforms, see Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2005; and Riskin 1987) . During 1979-89, GDP growth averaged 9.6 percent and exports rose by an average of 18.3 percent per annum. In addition, economic opening combined with the creation of special economic zones, began attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to China. This inflow transferred technology embodied in equipment and soft skills and helped enlarge manufacturing activities catering to foreign markets.
Growth slowed between 1989 and 1993, however, Deng Xiaoping"s southern tour 7 in January 1992 initiated a second wave of reforms and revived the growth rate of GDP, export momentum and the flow of FDI. To restart China"s reform effort which appeared to stall in the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping made widely published visit to Guangdong in January 1992, calling for a reigniting of reforms to sustain openness and growth. His call resonated with the progressive elements among the community of reformers, and China"s economic ascent has not paused ever since.
From the perspective of growth and industrial change in S.E. Asia, five facets of China"s development are of most relevance. First and foremost is China"s extraordinarily high growth rate which has averaged close to 10 percent per annum between 1994 and 2007. Although a slowing of the U.S. economy in 2008-2009 and China"s own efforts at dampening domestic demand so as to ease inflationary pressures might reduce growth rate, 8 the likely persistence of the current levels of investment, expansion of the urban workforce, and increase in total factor 7 Accompanied by his daughter, Deng Xiaoping visited Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Zhongshan, and Shunde between January 19 th and January 27 th 1992. Following his call to resist leftism and pursue reform, a communiqué was issued by the Politbureau to "accelerate the pace of reform and opening up to the outside world…we should guard against the right but we should mainly prevent the left" (Zhao 1993 A second facet is the growth of China"s exports, the composition of these exports and their competitiveness. For China"s S.E. Asian competitors, what matters is the overlap between their exports and those of China; the relative price competitiveness that affects export shares for individual products; the quality of specific exports which determines the prices these products command and the profits accruing to sellers; and movements up the value chain in existing product categories as well as diversification into new product categories higher on the technological scale and which embody greater domestic added value. When China"s exports overlap substantially with those of one of its competitors, when Chinese firms can quote lower prices and equivalent or better delivery schedules, and when they can ramp up production faster to meet demand, the advantage resides with China. If China"s revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 11 increasingly is in higher value and technologically more sophisticated products, producers in S.E. Asia have a harder time entering these markets and if they do, they face more intense competition. Similarly, if Chinese firms are quicker at raising the quality of products, the unit values of their exports will rise along with the profits, which advantage these firms relative to their competitors.
A third facet of relevance is China"s manufacturing capability, and how quickly the country is moving up the value chain. This has important implications for China"s foreign suppliers. The current division of labor between China and countries in S.E. Asia is that Chinese firms mainly concentrate on the final assembly of consumer electronics products, autos and various kinds of engineering products while importing many of the parts that go into these products from overseas. However, backward integration by Chinese manufacturers into components especially for products with long, non-modular and complex value chains such as 9 See Bosworth and Collins (2007) and Kuijs (2006) on estimates of China"s TFP. These range between 3.0 percent and 4 percent between 1993 and 2005. 10 China"s goal is to quadruple per capita GDP between 2000 and 2020, which assumes a growth rate of 8 percent per annum. Given the scope for inter-sectoral shifts in the workforce, for inter-industrial distribution of resources, technological upgrading, gains in allocation and organizational efficiencies and increase in human capital, such a goal would seem to be within reach (see Fogel 2006) .
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autos and some kinds of electronics will eat into the demand for imports. This is a logical step for Chinese producers as their manufacturing capability strengthens, because designing and producing components is more profitable. Furthermore, in some industries closer proximity among suppliers and assemblers assists in product development, reduces inventory costs, and speeds up delivery. A shift of component production to China, which is happening, does not mean that intra-industry trade cannot continue to thrive, however, its growth can be diminished and competition becomes more severe.
A fourth and related facet of China"s development, has a bearing on how quickly and in what directions its trading partners diversify their production and export mixes. This has to do with innovation capability and movement up the innovation value chain and into more technologically sophisticated product categories. South-East Asian exporters that are being hammered by competition from China in the low value, labor intensive manufacturers, have only two options: one is to cut costs, raise productivity and attempt to differentiate their products so as to win a temporary breathing space; the second and potentially more viable alternative, is to innovate and/or diversify into a nearby more high tech product group by strengthening the inhouse capacity to assimilate technology and to innovate with the help of own or contracted R&D.
With China rapidly raising domestic R&D, absorbing technology from abroad, and making haste to build a productive national innovation system, S.E. Asian countries are on notice that unless they move quickly, their options for maintaining growth by diversifying into higher tech products, could be constrained by China"s capacity to not only dominate the low tech and of the product spectrum but also to acquire an innovation and competitive advantage in the more lucrative, technologically advanced products. Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). These five are not the only avenues through which China"s emergence as an economic power-house affects the S.E. Asian region, but they are surely among the leading ones. Looking ahead, China"s own FDI in S.E. Asia and elsewhere, spearheaded by Chinese MNCs will add another factor, however, the scale, direction and consequences of such flows are difficult to gauge at this juncture.
In order to arrive at a better understanding of how the facets of China"s development enumerated above, rub against the economies of the S.E. Asian region, some numerical estimates and the findings of modeling exercises can be helpful. These are presented below.
Partners and Competitors
China is not only one of the world"s fastest growing economies, it is also remarkably trade oriented for a country of its size. From Table 2 we can see how the ratio of exports and China"s propensity to import is high and the recent trend has been upwards. This has been advantageous for its trading partners in the East Asian region, all of which have seen their exports to China expand at a rapid clip (Table 3) . A closer look at Malaysia"s and Thailand"s exports to China brings this out in sharper relief. 14 More striking than the change in composition of S.E. Asian exports to China is the transformation of China"s exports to Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (Table 6, Table 8 and Table 7 ). As a share of China"s total exports, these rose markedly in the late 1990s and have stabilized after [2001] [2002] (Figure 5 ), though in value terms, they are expanding at between 20 and 40 percent. In the mid 1990s, China"s exports to S.E. Asia were comprised mainly of processed light manufactures -metal products, silk, oil and fabric. These have been displaced by electronics, machinery, transport equipment and iron and steel products reflecting both greater diversity and on average, higher domestic added value. cemented by a recent free trade agreement with ASEAN, China has thus, on balance exerted a positive influence on the performance of the exporting industries in S.E. Asian countries.
Export Overlap
The overlap between China"s exports and those of S.E. Asian economies is an indicator of the pressure China is exerting on other trading nations in third country markets. In Table 9 we present the overlap between China"s exports and the exports of Malaysia and Thailand in three years. 15 The table shows that as China"s manufacturing industry has modernized and expanded into the electronics, ICT and electrical engineering subsectors, 16 the overlap in terms of commodities has increased and is over 98 percent with both Malaysia and Thailand. In terms of trade values it rose sharply after 1995 for Malaysia and has since stabilized at 61 percent whereas for Thailand it is still climbing beyond 71 percent. This raises the further question as to whether the S.E. Asian countries are responding by acquiring a comparative advantage in new export products and pushing up the unit value of their exports through improvements in quality. The answers to these questions can be derived from the information presented below starting with Figure 6 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 . These show that China has enlarged the share of electronics, and engineering products between 1995 and 2005, from about 10 percent of exports to nearly 30 percent, and is now contesting the exports from S.E. Asia. The leading exports from China, Malaysia and Thailand are in the electronics and engineering category, however, as Figure 9 shows, China is forging ahead much faster than the others. In response, Malaysia may 15 The pair-wise share of overlapping commodities is calculated as the number of products exported by Malaysia and each one of its competitors e.g. China, in a certain year, expressed as a proportion of the total number of commodities exported by Malaysia in that same year. The overlapping trade-value for a commodity X exported by Malaysia and China e.g., is calculated by identifying the minimum of the export values of X, for Malaysia and India. The pair-wise share of trade values for the overlapping commodities is then calculated by summing over all the overlapping products, and expressing it as a proportion of total trade value of Malaysia"s exports. 16 The Chinese government identified electronics as a "pillar" industry in 1994 and thereafter, provided it with a variety of financial and other incentives, including encouragement to promote technological transfer. The result has been a rate of growth that is little short of explosive. The share of electronics in GDP and in manufacturing rose from 1 percent and 5 percent respectively in 1995 to 3.2 percent and 10.2 percent respectively in 2005 (Zhao and others 2007) .
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have to rely more on primary products (e.g. palm oil and by products) and Thailand more on engineering products as can be seen from Figure 10 . Undoubtedly, China has reduced the scope for further enlarging the shares of electronics in the exports of both S.E. Asian countries. 
Monolithic integrated circuits, digital
Source: UNCOMTRADE 17 This is supported by observers of the industrial scene, who note the success of companies such as Huawei that produces mid range routers and Mindray Medical that manufactures ultrasound imaging equipment and equipment for blood testing ("China Rushes Upmarket" 2007). 18 In electronics, an integrated circuit (also known as IC, microcircuit, microchip, silicon chip, or chip) is a miniaturized electronic circuit (consisting mainly of semiconductor devices, as well as passive components) that has been manufactured on the surface of a thin substrate of semiconductor material. A monolithic integrated circuit is a common form of chip design, in which the base material (substrate) contains the pathways as well as active elements that take part in its operation. It has all the components manufactured into or on top of a single crystal of silicon (silicon chip), as opposed to Hybrid integrated circuits that have separate components attached by a conducting film to a ceramic base. The latter, is made up of individual semiconductor devices, as well as passive components, bonded to a substrate or circuit board. 
Export Specialization and Diversification
Additional insight into the evolving relative competitiveness of the three countries can be gauged from Figure 13 and Figure 14 which present the degree of export specialization (that is a crude indicator of competitiveness) in specific product categories and show how readily a country can diversify into other products categories so as to deflect export competition. The intuitive way of reading these figures is that a tighter concentration of the plotted commodity points is indicative of specialization in the chosen product categories and it also makes for ease of diversification from one type of product to "related" ones.
19 From these figures China comes 19 The idea behind this approach is that each commodity that a country produces creates different opportunities for future diversification (see Hausmann and Klinger 2006) . That is, some products offer easier and multiple diversification paths to other related products while others do not. In general, primary and resource-based products do not lead to many opportunities for diversification. By contrast, manufacturing goods such as electronics engage skills and assets that are similar to those required for the production of other manufacturing commodities, and hence are classified as high value products.
The measure used to assess if a country is exploiting its productive potential by focusing its efforts on high value goods, is that of the potential diversification opportunities arising from each one of its exports. In particular, the density of each commodity gives the probability that a country will export a pair of goods conditional on it already exporting at least one of the goods. The more a country specializes in high value goods (in terms of highest densities), the greater is its potential for diversification into other high value products.
For each product, a weighted average of the GDP per capita of countries exporting that product is calculated to assign a PRODY value, which is a proxy for the quality of a product. The weights denote the revealed comparative advantage of each country exporting the product. EXPY represents the level of sophistication of a country"s overall across as being more specialized in relatively high tech electronics and electrical engineering products and better placed to move upscale because "opportunities for diversification" are "closer". In contrast, both Malaysia and Thailand are less specialized, the former less so than the latter. On balance, they have more resources in mid and low tech industries and their options for industrial diversification are more diffuse. The five estimates of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), in Table 10 and Table 11 provide additional evidence on this score. What these show, is that China is moving more rapidly to stake out a comparative advantage in medium and high tech manufacturers, 20 whereas both Malaysia and Thailand have yet to graduate out of a comparative advantage in primary products and processed agricultural commodities. 21 These estimates of the RCA belie their principal exports, which are electronics and petroleum products in the case of Malaysia and electronics, petroleum products, and automotive equipments in the case of Thailand (Table 12, Table 13 ). Source: Authors" calculations export basket. It is calculated as the sum of the PRODY for each commodity in a country"s export basket, weighted by its share. Positive value of PRODY-EXPY means "upgrading" in a sense of exporting more sophisticated commodities relative to the overall export basket. 20 In 1985, China"s comparative advantage resided in primary products. This had been displaced by other products in 1992 (Hinloopen and Marrewijk 2004) . 21 These are similar to the results arrived at by Haltmaier and others (2007) . Taken together these findings indicate that China"s exports are growing faster than its competitors -from a large base -and that there is accumulating evidence of China specializing in higher tech products, and upgrading. Moreover, China"s revealed comparative advantage has shifted towards medium and high tech products whereas that of Thailand and Malaysia remains more in resource based and processed commodities. Hence China"s prospects of moving into new and higher value products are better than those of Malaysia and Thailand. In conjunction with the pressures arising from export overlap, and the changing composition of China"s exports, there is reason to believe that relative to China the competitive position of the S.E. Asian countries in the trade arena could be weakening, currently and prospectively.
Inter-Country Trade in Electronics
The apparent strengthening of China"s manufacturing capabilities buttressed by continuing heavy investment that speeds up embodied technological change and "learning", will enhance the competitiveness of China"s current exports by raising productivity. It will also make it easier for Chinese firms to integrate backwards and challenge the exports of electronic components and auto parts from S.E. Asian economies. Navarro (2007) finds that 19 percent of China"s price advantage over its competitors derives from a networking effect arising from the clustering of assemblers and component suppliers -local and foreign. The importance of proximity could strongly promote backward integration ("The China Price" 2004). 23 The increase in intra-industry trade between China on the one hand and Korea and Japan on the other has been analyzed by Kang and Lee (2007) . They find that, although China relies on these two countries for higher level intermediate inputs and capital goods, the pattern is changing. In the case of Korea, China is importing fewer of the more highly valued intermediates and more of lower valued ones. Moreover, the unit values of China"s own exports of intermediates to Japan and Korea is rising, which points to successful backward integration into higher value items. 
Innovating to Survive or to Grow
Sensing that the winds of trade are shifting and that competition from China calls for a growth prospects overall. Innovation need not be a zero-sum game. However, innovative firms can steal market share and even drive out others by becoming more competitive with respect to cost or quality or design; or by developing a variant product that eclipses rival products.
The race to become innovative is on and China is running harder than the S.E. Asian countries. There is no sure recipe to guide countries attempting to construct a productive national innovation system however, all recipes include the same ingredients. Broadly speaking percent. 27 In absolute terms this was a huge increase because GDP more than doubled during this interval. Measured in terms of purchasing power, China"s research expenditure is second 25 See Liu and Lundin 2007. 26 Firms in most S.E. Asian countries have been notably laggard in using innovation as a means of deriving competition advantage. Their attitude has been passive and it is governments rather than firms that have begun to take the initiative (Williamson 2004 , World Bank 2008b . Singapore however, has responded to the pressure from China"s exports by redoubling its efforts to diversify its comparative advantage through R&D, improving the education system to encourage creative thinking and entrepreneurship, and by enhancing further the attractiveness of the city state"s business environment (Liu 2007) . 27 Some of the most technologically dynamic countries such as the U.S., Germany, Japan, Korea, the U.K., and France are notable for the speed with which they ramped up spending on R&D from 1 percent of GDP to 2 percent of GDP in just about 10 years. China has also moved quickly. The share of resources diverted to R&D has risen faster in electronics and the ICT sectors. This represents a level of effort comparable to that of the leading industrialized countries, and as it is continuing, with China setting its sights on achieving a 2 percent rate by 2015, the returns should begin to accrue rapidly within the decade. The acceleration of patenting is an early indicator of progress (Jian and Jefferson 2005 , see also Hu and Jefferson 2008 for a longer perspective, and Sigurdson 2005 for a detailed assessment of China"s technological development). One important development with respect to R&D in China is the increasing share of enterprises (although most are state owned), a trend that raises the prospects of innovations being commercialized, and raising productivity. By 2002, 67 percent of R&D was conducted by firms, 22 percent in research institutes and 10 percent in universities, (Kostoff, Bhattacharya, and Pecht 2007; Segal and Greenberg 2006) . A more sophisticated and demanding consuming public, is putting more pressure on firms to introduce innovative products and new designs, as are China"s overseas buyers. ("China Design" 2005 China from some of the S.E. Asian countries in this regard is apparent from Table 14 . To strengthen research skills and enhance the productivity of research, China has encouraged FDI in R&D centers and thus far, more than 300 foreign firms -many of which are among the most innovative in the world -have established research facilities in China. This will have spillover effects that will augment China"s research capacity and encourage domestic firms to pursue innovation more aggressively. An open innovation system is being created through the efforts made to network with China"s vast diaspora of knowledge workers overseas. It is encouraged also by the incentives for universities and research institutes to collaborate with business firms in conducting research and developing technologies with commercial potential. In a similar vein, state owned enterprises as well as other firms, are casting around widely for better technologies by setting up "sentinel" laboratories in the U.S. and Europe; through the acquisition of firms overseas; and through subcontracting arrangements that enable Chinese producers to improve their design capabilities and acquire the tacit knowledge which helps enhance and develop process technologies. China"s domestic market for most manufactures is highly competitive and barriers to imports have been steadily reduced. Such openness and competition from imports identifies profitable opportunities and induces local producers to acquire new technologies so as to achieve competitive parity.
To facilitate the entry of firms in the more technologically dynamic areas, the government has increased the supply of venture capital from public providers and offered a range of incentives which have attracted private domestic and foreign venture capitalists. These incentives, including the option to exit via IPOs, have been a powerful draw for VCs. In a fairly short period of time, the number of Chinese and foreign VCs has multiplied and deal flow has risen. The big successes notched up thus far are by foreign VCs most of which are in medium tech activities but investors are comfortable with this because they are more concerned with the market prospects of a new company than with the technological sophistication of the product or service it is attempting to launch. Moreover, VCs operating in China are optimistic because the entrepreneurial energy level is high and people are ready to take risks. Chinese engineers and technical personnel frequently are ready to leave secure jobs in order to start their own companies. The lengthening list of successful young entrepreneurs is also creating a demonstration effect encouraging others to join.
Venture capitalists draw encouragement from China"s commitment to build world class research universities, and with the achievements to date of the leading tertiary level institutions not only in Beijing and Shanghai but also in places such as Chengdu, Xian and Wuhan. Efforts by governments in Malaysia and Thailand, mainly spearheaded by publicly funded providers of venture capital, have yet to induce a significant deal flow or to stimulate interest in high-tech activities by local entrepreneurs.
The accelerating tempo of VC activity in China is another indication of burgeoning innovation capability in China in contrast to Malaysia and Thailand where innovation remains stagnant. The risk for the S.E. Asian countries is that China will pull ahead in the technological race and make it harder to find new technological niches further along the value chain. In failing to raise the caliber of their major universities, the Southeast Asian countries have weakened their capacity to engage in the technological arms race and to graduate out of the increasingly vulnerable low cost model of development into a knowledge intensive one with better prospects.
Foreign Investment
Export oriented manufacturing industries in Southeast Asia have relied heavily on FDI and the issue countries such as Malaysia and Thailand face is whether FDI will assist them in transitioning to a higher industrial plane. For these countries, two questions loom large. First, what is the likely scale of future FDI. There is a worry that the attraction of China"s market and supply of skills will lure away some of the FDI which would come to S.E. Asia. Such diversion of flows has not been confirmed by research. In fact, China is pulling in FDI commensurate with its GDP and well below its neighbors to the south in per capita terms. China appears to be a different story and not because the MNCs have been more proactive. In China"s case technology transfer and industrial deepening through backward 28 Although the popular perception is that China is diverting FDI from S.E. Asian countries, the research on this has failed to uncover such a tendency. In fact, FDI in China is less than what its size and economic fundamentals would suggest. And FDI in China appears to induce some additional investment in S.E. Asia as investors seek to augment other parts of the regional supply chain. Only FDI in chemicals and foodstuff in China does not lead to parallel flows to S.E. Asia because of the nature of the supply chain for these commodities. Undoubtedly FDI in S.E. Asia fell after the crises of 1997-98 and has not fully recovered, but that may have more to do with perceived risks of producing in S.E. Asian, tightening labor markets in some countries, and saturated domestic product markets (Wu and others 2002 , Liu, Chow, and Li 2007 , Eichengreen and Tong 2005 , South-East Asia: China challenge 2002 ). The absence of any specific "China effect" on FDI in China is also supported by Fan and others (2007) . They find that the inflow is explained by economic performance, demographics and openness. There is little evidence of the FDI being disproportionate. Similarly, investment in China by US MNCs although it has been increasing, is still quite small and Branstetter and Foley (2008) do not find evidence that investment is being diverted from other destinations.
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integration, has been promoted in large part by incentives to and pressure upon MNCs to add value locally and transfer intangible technology capital while luring them with the potential of a large market. This push from the Chinese government strongly reaffirmed by the efforts of Chinese companies to internalize new technology, has been buttressed by MNCs own sense of longer term opportunities in China with respect to markets for their products and the supply of skills for production and R&D (A dragon in R&D 2006; Sigurdson 2005) .
Unlike the case in Malaysia and Thailand, the activities of MNCs in China have induced local firms to compete by stepping up their own efforts at absorbing technology and by innovating, which explains the "great wall of patents" described by Hu and Jefferson (2006) . 
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There is another side to FDI which promises to gain in importance. This is FDI by Chinese companies in S.E. Asia and FDI by firms in Malaysia and Thailand. 30 In East Asia, such intraregional FDI among the industrializing economies has been ongoing for some time but until the 1990s, it mainly took the form of first Japanese, then Korean and later Taiwanese FDI.
31
Thailand, Malaysia and China did not enter the fray until the mid 1990s and then only on a small scale although CP was already a major investor in China towards the end of the 1990s.
China now and in the future is likely to have an abundance of resources to invest overseas. To a lesser degree, so also will Malaysia and Thailand. (Fung, Liu, and Kao 2007; Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 2007; Wu 2005) . 31 This latter has served to transplant first light industry and now medium and high tech industry to other Asian countries (see for example Thun 2001) . 32 Alongside FDI, portfolio investment is likely to boom in the Asia region, led by sovereign wealth funds and including institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, all of which are accumulating resources in China and in Southeast Asia. Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are under the spotlight, not because they are a new phenomenon, but because the global current account imbalances and rising energy and mineral prices have allowed a few countries to accumulate enormous reserves. By the end of 2007, SWFs were estimated by the IMF to hold $3 trillion and they are projected to reach $12 trillion by 2012. The China Investment Corporation with $200 billion in assets is by no means the largest -that distinction goes to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority with assets valued at $875 billion -and it only began operating on September 29 th 2007, nevertheless, in the coming years it could become an important financier in S.E. Asia, influencing the level and pattern of investment and competing against institutional investors from the region in Asia and beyond (Teslik 2008 , Hildebrand 2008 , Setser 2008 . On China"s recent overseas investment and considerations that could influence longer term overseas investment strategy, see Fung, Liu, and Kao (2007) .
Two Scenarios for South East Asia
China"s interaction with Southeast Asian economies is expanding thus far to the mutual advantage of both parties. Trade has increased, other exchanges have grown, China is not absorbing a disproportionate volume of FDI, and the inevitable frictions between a more confident and assertive China and its neighbors have been kept in check through collective self restraint. Barring unforeseen developments, this positive sum status quo can continue for some years. Thailand, Malaysia and other S.E. Asian economies could well sustain GDP growth rates of 5-6 percent per annum for the next five years, with China averaging a rate of between 8 and 10 percent.
However, such equilibrium might not persist beyond the medium run. Two possible scenarios come to mind. One assumes that the Southeast economies are slow in mounting a response to the challenge posed by China. The other assumes that they enjoy a measure of success in proactively upgrading and diversifying their industrial activities. In either scenario, the industrial geography of S.E. Asia will change, however, in the second, the change will be far more benign and could become the basis for a new equipoise that could endure for decades into the future.
As noted above, Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand have become increasingly reliant on the exports of a fairly narrow range of "commodified" manufacturers. In the case of Thailand, electronics, autos and auto parts and food products account for 55 percent of total exports. Malaysia"s exports of electronics and electrical engineering products and processed food products comprise 60 percent of the total. Both countries are now competing with China in some of these product categories. Continued backward integration in China in the electronics industry, which is in the cards, will intensify competition in standardized electronic components. China"s lower wages 33 and strengthening manufacturing capabilities could begin to squeeze out exporters in Southeast Asia. China"s auto components industry is maturing rapidly and is already a major exporter and at current rates of investment, its footprint in regional and 33 Navarro (2007) Whereas in China, local companies are a large and expanding presence in the electronic and automotive industries and dominate food processing, the electronics industry in both
Thailand and Malaysia -not to mention the Philippines -is in the grip of foreign companies.
The automotive sector in Thailand is centered on foreign assemblers and component manufacturers. Malaysia"s auto industry is more homegrown but inefficient and vulnerable to foreign competition. Although both countries have sizable food processing industries, most producers are small scale and the few large firms have yet to establish a regional brand reputation and become serious players in regional markets. Foreign firms have maintained production bases in Malaysia and Thailand in the interests of diversifying sources of supply and 34 A factor that weighs in China"s favor with respect to export competitiveness is the continuing high level of investment in productive assets and in infrastructure as noted briefly above. This confers three advantages to Chinese producers" vis-à-vis their rivals in S.E. Asia. First it maximizes embodied technological change through the purchase of the latest plant and equipment. Second, heavy investment that enlarges productive capacity and raises output is also associated with more learning by doing and rising productivity. Third, an elastic supply of capital allows Chinese producers to achieve desirable levels of scale and to raise production much faster to accommodate a shift in market demand or to fulfill large orders. Fourth, the investment in logistics and communications capacity is vital for chipping away at the costs of shipping goods, working closely with buyers and other elements in a supply chain, and achieving a high degree of connectivity with markets across the world. That these big investments are paying off, is apparent from the ubiquity of Chinese goods across the world.
because a long history of production, has generated local manufacturing capability and familiarity with local conditions. There is in addition, a risk of S.E. Asia being reduced to a backwater not only because of the rise of China but more so because of a failure to climb up the innovation value chain. In other words, from Southeast Asia"s inability thus far, to complement manufacturing capability with innovation capability. The latter being the ticket to industrial upgrading and diversification into new areas.
A second scenario projects a positive-sum relationship between China and S.E. Asia and a comfortable co-existence a la Switzerland and Austria with Germany and France. This would 36 require a deliberate effort at specialization and the cultivation of world class expertise in a few high value products and services by Malaysia and Thailand. These product categories may not be high tech items in the conventional meaning of the term, after all watches, chocolates and cheeses are not in the same class as micro-processors, but it does not matter so long as they generate handsome returns. If Thailand, for example, were to realize its ambition of becoming a "kitchen of the world" and a Thai firm were to become the world"s leading producer of Asian foodstuffs with a strong focus on innovation, packaging, marketing and multinational distribution, this would provide a building block for future prosperity.
Were Malaysia to emerge as a force in tree crops, cost effective biofuels, and environmental technologies associated with intensive agriculture and tropical food products, these could very well become the cornerstone for its future development and the source of high value exports.
Observing Malaysia"s and Thailand"s struggles with deepening their electronics industries over twenty years, makes one ask whether the industrial future for these countries might lie in their areas of traditional comparative advantage areas, that are not so intensely contested. Succeeding in these product categories will also require heavy expenditure on R&D in agricultural-biotechnology, materials sciences, packaging, design and other areas, however, both countries would be starting with a stronger hand and a clearer focus. Relative to China, neither Malaysia nor Thailand has much domestic innovation capability and worse their R&D is non optimally distributed among a variety of technological fields. Only a concerted effort on a narrower front has much chance of yielding commercial results within the decade"s breathing space both countries have. If this strategy works and domestic firms are able to acquire a multinational presence, a downsizing of electronics, auto parts and engineering industries were it to occur, would be offset by the expansion of agricultural, resource based and processing industries which rely on advanced research. In a warming and more populous world in which all natural resources may be under pressure, resource based products could enjoy stronger market demand and more favorable terms of trade.
In either scenario, there is likelihood that countries with the per capita GDP of Malaysia or even Thailand will no longer remain competitive in assembly processing and testing activities associated with electronics, ICT and the automotive sector where the value added is low. The competition from China, India and other lower income countries will make it increasingly 37 impracticable to sustain these industries. The shape of the industrial landscape to come in the next decade will depend upon the capacity of S.E. Asian countries to consolidate their core competitive advantage in resource based, processing industries and diversify along the innovation value chain. China"s industrialization is likely to continue deepening in the coastal areas and spreading selectively to cities in the interior and its industry will caste a long shadow over the rest of East Asia and not just this region alone.
The competition between China and S.E. Asian economies in the Asian region and in western markets is perhaps the major focus of medium term interest. However, over the longer term, China"s ability to develop and to penetrate markets in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and Latin America could solidify its competitive advantage. This penetration will be assisted by three factors: one is the activities of China"s construction companies that are helping build transport infrastructure and are ambassadors for China"s products and services. The activities of these companies and the economic footholds they help to create will not only support the entry of Chinese FDI, Chinese services providers working in myriad projects across the world will contribute to the emergence of China"s "soft power", and the form it takes and how it is buoyed by China"s exports of fashions, cultural products and name brands, which will inevitably follow.
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A third factor, is the aid China has begun providing some countries which opens up economic pathways linking China to the aid recipients. It is impossible to say at this stage how China"s relationships might evolve, however, China"s entry into the club of aid giving countries will have long term ramifications.
Unlike China, S.E. Asian countries have a low economic profile outside the region and are doing little to raise it. Their efforts at penetrating new markets overseas are meager and this could have serious long term consequences. The globe bestriding MNCs of the future are not being nurtured in S.E. Asia. The region is not seen as the factory of the world, the way China is, S.E. Asia is not conspicuous in assisting other countries even in a token manner, and currently, it has no soft power at all.
